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Abstract— Dynamic coalitions are temporary alliances formed
between agents in order to achieve specific business goals. Such
coalitions can vary widely in architecture, scale, complexity
and lifetime. Few techniques have so far emerged to assist in
the analysis and design of coalitions. We apply formal model-
oriented techniques to help structure the space of dynamic
coalitions, with an emphasis on modelling information flow. A
series of models is developed in VDM, each emphasising a
different “dimension” of the space. These are used to characterise
a new dynamic coalition architecture under development for
the chemical engineering industry. Tool-supported analysis of
this formal model has identified potential improvements in the
coalition architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Improvements in the capabilities of networking and ambient
computing technologies enable individuals and organisations
to form dynamic coalitions. These are temporary alliances,
driven by a desire to cooperate towards a common goal. For
example, in dynamic business environments [1], companies
may form a coalition to capitalise on a market opportunity.
In disaster response scenarios, emergency services, military
units and civil organisations must work together to mitigate
the impact of a dangerous incident [2].
The ability to analyse information flow, security, privacy
and trust in dynamic coalitions is particularly significant in
many applications. However, the architects of such coalitions
currently lack a basis on which to evaluate at design-time the
likely consequences of the decisions that they make regarding
coalition architecture and policies. The long-term aim of our
work is to leverage formal modelling technology to help
provide such a basis. In this paper, we show how formal
modelling of particular dimensions of dynamic coalitions can
help towards this goal, illustrating this with an application in
the chemical engineering industry.
It is worth briefly identifying the two practitioner groups
who are our “customers”. Colleagues in the UK Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory wished to develop formal
tools to assist in considering information flow in defence-
related coalitions. Other colleagues in the chemical engineer-
ing industry (via the GOLD project1) are developing middle-
ware to support coalitions that form around the development
of novel chemical compounds. Both groups need tools for
analysing security and access control in different dynamic
coalition structures, and both encouraged a formal approach
1http://www.goldproject.ac.uk/
in order to form a sound basis for the development of analytic
tools.
Our approach is constructive. Since there is such a wide
range of possible coalition architectures, we first map out a
space of possible coalition structures using formal modelling
techniques. We then validate the approach with our customers,
by applying it to a real dynamic coalition structure in the
chemical engineering industry, using it to help analyse access
control policies. Our future work will address the development
of stronger tools supporting analysis of our models.
We map the space of dynamic coalitions by identifying
several “dimensions”, each corresponding to some aspect of
the coalition that may be significant to its architect, e.g. mem-
bership policy or information transfer. In each dimension, we
distinguish information (the material traded between agents
in a coalition) from meta-information (information about the
agents, coalitions or information itself, such as the age of a
piece of information, or the identity of a coalition). Generally,
each dimension that we explore corresponds to a form of
meta-information and the models that we develop make that
meta-information explicit. In each model, consideration of the
invariants, preconditions etc. leads to alternative models rep-
resenting design choices. The result of this analysis is a suite
of models that deal with individual dimensions and present
the coalition architect with a range of design alternatives,
allowing a particular architecture to be placed within the space
of coalitions.
There are several taxonomies of dynamic coalitions, mainly
in management science. Some categorise coalitions by struc-
ture of information flow [3], and some use dimensions such
as strategy, process, structure, knowledge and culture [4].
Much attention is paid to the network security and access
control in military dynamic coalitions [5], [6], [7]. However,
existing approaches do not provide a formal basis for analysing
coalition properties during design and operation.
Our motivation is to support the architect in designing coali-
tion structures. We have therefore selected dimensions that
cover a large space of possible dynamic coalitions, and which
present the architect with design alternatives. We do not aim
to provide a comprehensive taxonomy, but we have validated
the approach and the dimensions selected, by showing their
applicability to the GOLD architecture, using the models to
help identify areas of incompleteness and inconsistency in
existing designs. We would expect the range of dimensions
selected, and their associated models, to be extended in future.
We have used formal modelling technology based on the
Vienna Development Method (VDM) [8], [9], [10]. VDM,
like Z [11] and B [12], uses a model-oriented language that
emphasises the modelling of data, state and functionality,
making it suitable for describing the functionality involved
in forming and operating dynamic coalitions. The analysis of
other aspects, such as the purposes and goals of coalitions,
would of course require the use of complementary formalisms.
VDM has been used extensively to model computer-based
systems, especially with domain experts [13], and benefits
from strong tool support.
In this paper we introduce the main dimensions of dynamic
coalitions that have been identified, the formal models that
describe them and their application in chemical engineering.
We begin with a basic model for coalitions that have a mem-
bership dimension (Section II). We then explore the models
of information storage (Section III), and communication (Sec-
tion IV). Section V briefly examines the dimensions of autho-
risation structure, provenance, time and trust. In Section VI we
describe our application in the chemical engineering industry,
and the associated tool support. Section VII draws conclusions
from the work conducted so far and identifies further research.
For reasons of brevity we show only selected aspects of
the modelling work here. The dimensions and associated
models are described in [14]2. The formal notation used is
ISO Standard VDM-SL [15] mathematical syntax, with some
“sugaring” to ease presentation.
II. COALITIONS AND COALITION MEMBERSHIP
Our basic model is of a global state composed of Agents
which may join and leave groupings known as Coalitions.
When we consider each aspect of a coalition (membership, in-
formation transfer, provenance, trust etc.) we have to consider
where relevant data lies in the system: at the global, coalition
or agent level. This tripartite structure is present throughout
the work reported in [14].
The types Aid and Cid represent possible agent and
coalition identifiers respectively. Elements of both types are
structureless tokens. In this paper introduced types will be
tokens unless explicitly defined otherwise. We will introduce
a type Agent to represent agents. Our basic state is formally
defined as follows:
Σ :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals , agents) △ (
⋃
rng coals) ⊆ dom agents
The state Σ consists of two components: coals records an
association (in VDM, a mapping) between coalition identifiers
and the sets of (identifiers of) agents that are members of the
coalition; the agents component relates agent identifiers to
agents. The invariant is a predicate ensuring that the agent
identifiers in coalitions are all genuine, i.e. they are known in
the agents component. Note that, in this model, we allow the
2The models developed are available at
http://www.dirc.org.uk/resources/dc.html
same set of agents to be participating in two different coali-
tions, allowing for different structures, membership schemes
etc.
Membership meta-information is a relation between agents
and coalitions. It is already present in the Σ model, so it is used
as a starting point. A key question is: where does responsibility
lie for performing the operations that join and remove agents
to and from coalitions? The model Σ takes a coalition-oriented
view of membership in the sense that the agent identifiers are
associated with their individual coalitions. In order to describe
the act of joining an agent to a coalition, we give an operation
specification:
Join (a:Aid , c:Cid)
ext wr coals : Cid m−→ Aid -set
rd agents : Aid m−→ Agent
pre a ∈ dom agents ∧ c ∈ dom coals ∧ a /∈ coals(c)
post coals = ↼−−coals † {c 7→↼−−coals(c) ∪ {a}}
The precondition in the Join operation records the assumption
that the agent and coalition are both known, and that the
agent is not already a member of the coalition. The Remove
operation performs the inverse:
Remove (a:Aid , c:Cid)
ext wr coals : Cid m−→ Aid -set
pre c ∈ dom coals ∧ a ∈ coals(c)
post coals = ↼−−coals † {c 7→↼−−coals(c) \ {a}}
Both of these operations require that the coalition already
exists prior to the addition or removal of a member.
If authorisation to join a coalition is an important factor,
this dimension may be elaborated. For example, support for
joining and leaving decisions may have to be gathered from
more than a certain threshold of existing coalition members.
This threshold value must be recorded within the coalition
structure. If we assume it to be value between zero and one,
we get model Σauth :
Σauth :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Coalition
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals , agents) △⋃
{c.members | c ∈ rng coals} ⊆ dom agents
Coalition :: members : Aid -set
threshold : R
inv (-, threshold) △ 0 ≤ threshold ∧ threshold ≤ 1
Yet more elaborate membership authorisation schemes may be
envisaged and modelled. For example, the model could itself
be generic with a set of parameters governing membership
determination.
III. INFORMATION
In order to model the flow of information in dynamic
coalitions, it is necessary to decide on a representation for
information, its storage and creation within the model. This
section explores these dimensions, while Section IV deals with
information flow itself.
Several significant abstraction decisions have to be made
regarding information. We will use the term “information” in
a general sense to describe the data traded between agents
in a coalition, and between coalitions and their environment.
Given that the purpose of the model to analyse information
flow, rather than accuracy of information with respect to some
external world, we will also refrain from attempting to model
this semantic relationship.
Representing and Identifying Information: Models of spe-
cific coalitions may choose common information represen-
tation frameworks. However, for the purposes of modelling
information flow, the models we develop here are neutral about
the particular representation chosen. We will use the data type
Information to stand for the chosen representation, and treat
this as a collection of unstructured tokens.
Information is an unusual kind of resource in that it may
be copied and modified arbitrarily, as well as transferred. If
an information item is copied, and we wish to distinguish
the copy from the original, it is necessary to identify each
item by means of a key. In this case, where individual items
have unique keys as identifiers, it is necessary to maintain a
mapping from the keys to the information values (formally,
InfoKey
m
−→ Information). An alternative is to regard
Information items as unkeyed values and so to regard the
collection of information as an Information-set. There are
advantages for the mapping model because one can discuss,
for example, the visibility of information in terms of the sets
of InfoKey . However, this approach makes the discussion of
copying more difficult. Another reason for preferring the set
structure is that it is always possible to embed a “key” within
Information , although this has to be done with an awareness
of “normal forms” and any requirements for uniqueness. The
decision about whether to use a mapping-based or set-based
model is likely to vary between applications. We illustrate
both approaches. In the first part of the paper we represent
information as sets of tokens, and in the case study in
Section VI we use a mapping to represent the information.
Locating Information in the Model: Taking the basic model
Σ as a starting point again, we can envisage information being
held at agent, coalition and global levels, as was the case for
membership. At the agent level, the Agent data type can be
augmented with an information store. We choose to represent
this using a set of Information tokens. The resulting definition
of Agent would be:
Agent :: info : Information-set
Shared information, common to members of a coalition, would
reside at the coalition level. The coalition model is therefore
more than just the set of member identifiers, and has its own
information set. We introduce the type Coalition to model
this:
Coalition :: info : Information-set
· · · : · · ·
Global common knowledge, shared across the space of all
coalitions, is at the outermost level, leading to a new model:
Σloc :: info : Information-set
coals : Cid
m
−→ Coalition
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
We have not added an invariant that information stored at the
global or coalition levels should be present within agents. This
allows us to model problematic situations in which a global
view is not shared by all the participating agents. We have
opted for what is intended to be an intuitive model here. Other
models, such as only allowing information to be stored within
agents, are possible.
Creating and Sharing Information: Here we consider the
basic operations of information creation and sharing “up the
hierarchy” that can be described over the Σloc model. If we
choose not to model the source of information explicitly, we
must include within agents an operation such as Discover,
which adds new set of Information tokens to the agent’s
knowledge base:
Discover (a:Aid , is : Information-set)
ext wr agents : Aid m−→ Agent
pre a ∈ dom agents
post agents = ↼−−−−agents †
{a 7→ µ(
↼−−−−
agents(a), info 7→
↼−−−−
agents(a).info ∪ is)}
Since the model is intended for the analysis of information
transfer and is not concerned with modelling the external
environment, this operation is almost trivial, simply allowing
information to appear in the model. The operation is defined at
the agent level (it works on the information store of a specific
agent). One might envisage a similar operation being available
at the coalition level, if the coalition has its own ability to
acquire information independent of the participating agents. It
is somewhat harder to motivate a version of the operation at
the global level.
The layered model permits the definition of operations
describing the movement of information from the agent level
to coalition level, a form of sharing:
Share (a:Aid , c:Cid , is : Information-set)
ext wr coals : Cid m−→ Coalition
rd agents : Aid m−→ Agent
pre a ∈ dom agents ∧ is ⊆ agents(a).info ∧
c ∈ dom coals ∧ a ∈ coals(c).members
post coals = ↼−−coals †
{c 7→ µ(
↼−−
coals(c), info 7→
↼−−
coals(c).info ∪ is)}
A similar operation could promote information from coalition
to global level, placing it in the info field of Σloc .
Losing Information: When an agent leaves a coalition, the
information held within the agent may be lost to the coalition.
A protocol might be employed which requires the sharing
of certain information (placing at the coalition level) before
permission for departure is granted. In the opposite direction,
the agent may be able to copy coalition-level information into
its individual store prior to departure from the coalition. At
coalition dissolution, information stored at the coalition level
could be deleted or migrated up to the global level, or copied
or distributed among the agents in the former coalition.
If the information stores are shared repositories, it is pos-
sible to model agents losing access to information but this
raises questions about which part of the store the departing
agent had accessed and when. These questions would be
particularly pertinent if the departing agent may have hostile
intent. Countermeasures here include changing information so
that the knowledge itself is altered so that the departing agent’s
knowledge is no longer meaningful. This is practiced regularly
with such information such as group keys.
IV. INFORMATION TRANSFER
In this section, we consider the options for movement of
information between agents. The models developed in this
section describe the functionality of information transfer on
the basis of the meta-information about membership and infor-
mation discussed in previous sections. At this level, the model
is not concerned with mechanisms of transmission, so much
as the preconditions: who can participate in an information
transfer, and what can be transmitted? As a starting point, we
extend the original base model Σ to include the information
stored in each agent as a set of Information tokens.
Σsimp :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals , agents) △ (
⋃
rng coals) ⊆ dom agents
Agent = Information-set
It is likely that individual agents will operate policies regard-
ing the clearing of information for transfer. In military contexts
this is implemented via a system of classification levels for
information and clearance levels for personnel: documents can
only be read if the clearance level of the reader is at least as
high as the classification of the document. At a high level
of abstraction, this could be considered as a mapping from
each piece of Information to the set of potential recipients.
This is modelled within the extended Agent type below as the
mapping “clearance”:
Agent :: info : Information-set
clearance : Information
m
−→ Aid -set
inv (info, clearance) △ ∀i ∈ dom clearance · i ∈ info
Σa-tr :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals , agents) △
⋃
rng coals ⊆ dom agents ∧⋃
{
⋃
rng ags .clearance | ags ∈ rng agents} ⊆
dom agents
The extra invariant clause on the type Agent asserts that
all the information which may be revealed by an agent is
known by that agent. The second conjunct of the invariant
on Σa-tr asserts that all the agents to whom information may
be revealed are valid.
The clearance component can be used to govern information
transfer:
InfoTransfer (from, to:Aid , is : Information-set)
ext wr agents : Aid m−→ Agent
pre {from, to} ⊆ dom agents ∧
∀i ∈ is · to ∈ agents(from).clearance(i) ∧
is ⊆ agents(from)
post agents = ↼−−−−agents †
{to 7→ µ(
↼−−−−
agents(to), info 7→
↼−−−−
agents(to).info∪is)}
Alternative policies may be pursued, for example returning
an explicit error if the clearance precondition is not satisfied,
or transferring the cleared subset of is : is \ {i ∈ is | to /∈
agents(from).clearance(i)}. In this generic model, we do not
exclude certain forms of communication such as self-to-self or
sharing information that may already be present at coalition or
global levels, since we may wish to analyse the consequences
of these behaviours.
V. OTHER DIMENSIONS
In this section we present a selection of other dimensions in
outline only. In [14] we discuss these and further dimensions
in more detail.
Governance: Various “structures” have been proposed for
dynamic coalitions, mostly limited to information trans-
fer (e.g. [3]). For example, a star structure has a single
agent as the nexus for all communication in the coalition; a
tree structure has local star structures passing information up
from centres to the next level. Our modelling work suggests
that information transfer structures describe just part of a
coalition’s character. A key aspect of a coalition’s structure is
its governance: which agents may authorise specific acts such
as information transfer or membership operations. Our use
of pre/postcondition specifications for operations governing
membership and information transfer emphasises that these
operations may require permission. Often, authorisation struc-
tures in a dynamic coalition will exist only as a consequence
of rights, obligations and privileges which are agreed, known
and held within the coalition. The explicit, early consideration
of these structures is likely to have a significant effect on the
design of a robust coalition.
In this dimension, we consider authorisation structures
explicitly and independent of the operations being authorised.
The meta-information expressed in the models of governance
concerns the authorisation structures which may be added to
any of the models developed so far, allowing forms such as
star and tree structures to be represented for authorisation as
well as communication.
Operations, such as those performing information transfer,
which share a common authorisation structure, may require
authorisation from one or more specific agents. We thus con-
sider an authorisation structure as a relation between agents.
Formally, we could define a data type representing such a
relation:
AuthRel = (Aid ×Aid)-set
The presence of a pair (a1, a2) in a relation indicates that a1
is capable of authorising an operation by a2. Properties of
this data-type can be specified with invariants. Given such a
general model, it is possible to describe common structures
by means of combinations of conditions on the relation. For
example, a tree-based authorisation structure is characterised
by a constraint that every agent that is subject to authorisation
is subject to only one authoriser.
Modelling Provenance: In a dynamic coalition, it will often
be important for an agent to know the source of the infor-
mation it holds (its provenance), as well as the information
itself. A simple model is for each agent to associate with each
item of information the agent from whom it was received. We
can alter the information record within an agent to associate
a single providing agent with each information token. In a
more realistic model, when information is transferred, the
provenance information is passed with it. Agents would build
up a list of agents, representing the path that the information
has taken to them, as in the model Σp∗ .
Σp∗ :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Aid -set
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
Agent :: agentinfo : TrackedInformation-set
TrackedInformation :: item : Information
prov : Aid∗
Such a model immediately raises the possibility of an agent
lying about the provenance information it passes on, and the
(in)consistency of corresponding provenance trails. We could
include an invariant to stipulate that provenance information
is passed on accurately and in full, if this was appropriate to
the coalition.
Trust: The problem of how to infer trust from meta-
information is still open3, and proposed solutions are neces-
sarily context dependent. After trust has been computed the
question of how to use it has many answers, again context
dependent. We do not consider these questions, and begin by
assuming that trust values have been obtained (represented
as an ordered type Trustvalue). These trust values may
represent an agent’s trust in other agents, or an agent’s trust
in information.
An agent’s trust in other agents can be represented as
Agent :: aTrust : Aid
m
−→ Trustvalue
Over time, the aTrust mapping will be updated, according to
some set of rules that an agent has. For example, if an agent
a applies a “Friend-of-a-friend” rule, and agent b (whom a
trusts) itself trusts agent c, then agent a may be inclined to
trust agent c as well.
3This is evidenced by the TrustCom project and the related iTrust
conferences: http://www.eu-trustcom.com
Coalition members might be expected to trust the other
members of the coalition to some degree. If this were the
case, it could be mandated by a suitable invariant:
Σtrust-c :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Coalition
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
inv (coals , -) △
∀c ∈ dom coals · ∀m,m ′ ∈ coals(c).members ·
m.aTrust(m ′) ≥ coals(c).cTrust
Coalition :: members : Aid -set
cTrust : Trustvalue
Expiry Times: Some information “expires”: it goes out of
date at a certain time. In the simple agent model below, a
single time is associated with each piece of information, with
a special value “nil” to denote that a piece of information
is always valid. At the recorded time, the value of the
information changes in some quantifiable way: for example,
a document may move from “classified” to “unclassified”, or
meteorological data may change from “current” to “out-of-
date”.
Agent :: agentinfo : Information-set
current -time : Time
Information :: item : token
expire : [Time]
Using expire, an agent can check if a piece of information is
still valid at a particular time.
still -valid : Information × Time → B
still -valid(info, time) △
info.expire = nil ∨ info.expire ≥ time
It is possible that collated information may remain valuable
for longer than any of its elements. This can be modelled in
a straightforward way. Further, we describe here predictable
expiry times. If information could also expire at the occurrence
of an unpredictable event we would need to refine the model.
VI. CASE STUDY: THE GOLD ARCHITECTURE
This section outlines a case study conducted in order to
help validate the modelling work described above (see [14]
for further detail). We describe the virtual organisation archi-
tecture under development within the GOLD project [16] and
show how the architectural choices made in GOLD can be
positioned within the space of dynamic coalitions outlined
above. We illustrate our approach to leveraging the benefit
of the formal model by describing tools for analysing access
control that are based on our modelling work.
The GOLD project is developing a software architecture to
support the formation, operation and termination of business
coalitions (Virtual Organisations) in the high-value chemicals
industry. The production of a chemical involves a large number
of stages, including initial experiments, building and running
of industrial-scale plant and safety analysis of by-products. A
coalition of companies often forms around the production of a
single chemical, since few companies have the resources to see
one chemical right through from inception to marketing. These
coalitions are loosely bound together with members joining
as necessary and leaving when their part of the process is
complete. The GOLD architecture uses web services to allow
companies to communicate information, transfer documents
and access one another’s resources. It is intended that each
company in the GOLD environment will offer a standard set
of services in a uniform way, allowing coalitions to form and
operate at a much greater rate than is currently possible.
In the GOLD environment, overlapping coalitions can be
formed. In a sense, this environment forms a single global
coalition, whose purpose is to form smaller and more con-
strained coalitions around particular development processes.
A single company may be in many such coalitions. We have
developed a model of the GOLD architecture, identifying the
subspace of dynamic coalitions which it may support. With
this in mind, we have begun an ongoing process of review-
and scenario-based validation of our GOLD model with do-
main experts, dealing with each dimension and enhancing the
GOLD model in accordance with feedback. Even in early
stages, the modelling exercise has identified issues in the
GOLD architecture and, where appropriate, these are identified
below.
Coalition Membership: Both companies (agents) and com-
pany employees (users) may be members of a GOLD coalition.
They may both have associated roles.
Σgold :: coals : Cid
m
−→ Coalition
agents : Aid
m
−→ Agent
users : Uid
m
−→ User
Coalition :: members : (Aid | Uid)-set
aroles : Aid
m
−→ aRole-set
uroles : Uid
m
−→ uRole-set
inv (-, aroles , -) △
∃! aid ∈ dom aroles · LEADER ∈ aroles(aid)
Agent :: employees : Uid -set
The information about a company includes its employees. We
must also ask the question “Must a user in a coalition be
an employee of a member company?” This is not stipulated
by [16], but if in a particular coalition the answer is yes, it
can be enforced within the model by an invariant.
Every GOLD coalition will be initiated by a single leader,
and we enforce this by the invariant. Membership of the
coalition will be at the discretion of this leader, but companies
will be able to leave unilaterally. Validation of the model has
raised the issue of the procedures surrounding the removal of
a leader from a coalition (this leads to a potential invariant
violation).
Information Storage: Within GOLD, a document “is the
fundamental unit of information exchanged between VO mem-
bers” [16]. Each project will have a set of documents asso-
ciated with it. These may be stored centrally or on a VO
member’s local site. GOLD will “provide seamless access to
information regardless of its physical location” [16].
An environment-wide registry defines a common under-
standing of the classes of document which may be exchanged
between companies. Agents and coalitions may have Docu-
ment Repositories (dr). Documents placed in these storage
facilities may be retrieved using an index or identifier. This
makes a map between identifiers and documents the most natu-
ral representation of information storage. An agent in multiple
coalitions must keep track of which of their documents are part
of which coalition (coalinfo).
Σgold :: · · · : · · ·
doc-type : LAB-RESULTS | MNGT-REP | . . .
Coalition :: · · · : · · ·
dr : Did
m
−→ Document
Agent :: employees : Uid -set
dr : Did
m
−→ Document
coalinfo : Cid
m
−→ Did -set
Information Insertion: A GOLD VO will run a project to an
agreed project plan. This plan will include which documents
should be created and when, and the project member (User or
Agent) tasked with creating them. The creation of a document
acts as a milestone for the project plan. When a document
is created it may be added to the coalition repository. In the
operation below, the user u from company comp adds a single
document d to a coalition.
AddToVO (u:Uid , comp:Aid , d :Document ,
did :Did , c:Cid)
ext wr coals : Cid m−→ Coalition
pre u ∈ dom users ∧ comp ∈ dom agents ∧
{u, comp} ⊆ coals(c).members ∧
u ∈ agents(comp).employees ∧
did 6∈ dom coals(c).dr ∧ c ∈ dom coals ∧
∃a ∈ dom agents · a ∈ coals(c).members ∧
permits(a, u, {d}, c)
post coals =
↼−−
coals †
{c 7→ µ(
↼−−
coals(c), dr 7→
↼−−
coals(c).dr∪{did 7→ d})}
Within coalition c, the project plan will need to be consulted
to determine if user u is permitted to create that document. The
predicate permits captures this.
When a document is added, a new access control policy
is created for that document. Initially, it will contain rules
imposed by the high-level project policy. For example, they
may ensure conformance to a legal obligation. When a new
document is added to the project the author is entitled to add
further access rules to these pre-existing rules.
Information Transfer: An agent in a coalition may request
documents from the coalition repository directly, or from
another participating agent or user. In both cases the coalition
access control policy must be enforced.
The operation below describes the formal transfer of a
document from one agent to another. The behaviour of the
access control policy is captured as the predicate authorises.
A transfer is allowed only if it is authorised by an appropriate
member of the coalition. It is important that we identify the
particular coalition within which the transfer is taking place.
This is because many coalitions may exist at any one time and
confidential information relevant to one coalition should not
be passed under the auspices of another.
InfoTransfer (from, to:Aid , d :Document ,
did :Did , c:Cid)
ext wr agent : Aid m−→ Agent
pre {from, to} ⊆ dom agents ∧
d ∈ rng agents(from).dr ∧
did 6∈ dom coals(c).dr ∧
c ∈ dom coals ∧ {from, to} ⊆ coals(c).members ∧
∃a ∈ dom agents · a ∈ coals(c).members ∧
authorises(a, from, to, {d}, c)
post agents = ↼−−−−agents †
{to 7→ µ(
↼−−−−
agents(to),
dr 7→
↼−−−−
agents(to).dr ∪ {did 7→ d})}
Note that the predicate authorises need not require the
intervention of an authorising agent for every information
transfer: permission to distribute documents may be granted
in advance and stored until referenced by the authorises
predicate.
Other Dimensions: Concerning governance, every GOLD
coalition will be initiated by a single leader, and we can
enforce this by the invariant in Σgold . The authorisation
structure of a GOLD coalition will therefore naturally be a
star formation, with the leader as the nexus. Validation of the
model has raised the question of how to handle the case of
a subcontractor choosing to further subcontract their work.
Whether or not this should be treated as a separate coalition
is unclear in GOLD.
For provenance, the GOLD architecture will provide a
secure archival service for future audit, available only to au-
thorised members. It can be modelled by creating a document
repository at the coalition level. The InfoTransfer operation
definition is then expanded to include the automatic updating
of the archive facility.
The GOLD architecture does not impose a model of trust.
Companies will be free to trust (or mis-trust) information,
communications and other companies as they choose.
Leveraging the model: We aim to leverage the benefit
of our modelling work mainly through “lightweight” for-
mal methods mechanisms, particularly via execution-based
analysis of the formal models. This approach is particu-
larly strongly supported by VDMTools4 which includes an
interpreter implementing an operational semantics of VDM-
SL. This permits rapid validation of the model using test
scenarios, supported by test coverage analysis tools. Further,
an application programming interface allows models to be
executed in the interpreter via interfaces designed to make
4http://www.vdmbook.com/tools.php
the model accessible to domain-based experts. Using this
technology, we are developing a workbench to enable system
architects to design access control policies for GOLD dynamic
coalitions.
A GOLD access control policy is potentially complicated. It
may be written by a number of different people, and conflicts
and ambiguities may arise. Policies are written in the eXtended
Access Control Markup Language [17]. We have developed a
model of the semantics of XACML policies in VDM, allowing
specific policies to be translated to VDM [18]. A policy writer
who adds new rules to the pre-existing policy may confirm that
the combined rules behave as anticipated before the policy
is updated. Together with the VDM model presented in this
paper, this gives us the opportunity to investigate the behaviour
of proposed VOs and projects before they are formed. Access
requests derived from workflows to be supported by the
coalition are translated to calls to the authorises function in the
InfoTransfer operation precondition. These calls are evaluated
in the interpreter against the access control model derived from
the XACML policy.
Our interpreter-based approach allows coalition developers
to analyse new and updated access control policies for weak-
nesses and inconsistencies before committing them to the run-
ning coalition systems. In future, it will allow the developers of
other coalitions to ensure that dimensions such as information
transfer are described strongly enough to support the workflow
requirements.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have used a formal model-oriented specification lan-
guage as the basis for an exploration of the space of dynamic
coalitions. The modelling language’s emphasis on abstractions
of data, state and operations has encouraged a focus on the
“meta-information” that characterises the structure and infor-
mation flows of a coalition. As a result, several dimensions
have been identified along which dynamic coalition struc-
tures may vary. We have placed one real virtual organisation
scheme, that of the GOLD project, in the space spanned
by the dimensions that we have identified. Doing so has
identified several areas in which the GOLD architecture can
be clarified or improved. Future work is envisaged in several
areas, outlined below.
Designing Dynamic Coalitions: The challenge in building
systems to support dynamic coalitions lies in providing just
sufficient structure to permit validation of emergent properties
without over-constraining heterogeneity and flexibility. Possi-
ble directions for further work include exploring/validating the
dimensions by applying them to a wider range of known and
possibly new dynamic coalition structures. A particular area of
interest is in predicting the consequences for information flow
of two coalitions merging. We also intend to investigate the
description of further structures that are superimposed on the
coalition itself and investigate policy languages for describing
access control on the basis of meta-information.
Although the work done so far has been within a formal
modelling framework, many of the potential benefits do not
require the designer to use formal apparatus. For example, we
intend to develop proof obligations for dynamic coalitions but
have also begun to use the formal models to develop checklists
for coalition architects working in each dimension.
Validation of Dynamic Coalition Models: Discharging con-
sistency obligations and domain-specific validation conjectures
for VDM models can be done at various levels of confidence,
ranging from testing to formal proof. For models of dynamic
coalitions, one may envisage several ways of leveraging further
benefits from exposing the model to domain experts. An
executable model linked to a suitable interface permits ad
hoc exploration of the coalition model by a user [9], [10]).
With features such as invariant and precondition checking,
this permits systematic analysis of normative as well as
some failure behaviours. Scenario scripts can be defined and
executed, representing paths through state transition models.
Indeed, under strict constraints, it may be possible to search
systematically for states having specific properties.
Domain Based Security: Domain Based Security [19] fo-
cuses on the way information is shared. We would like to
integrate this model with our existing models of dynamic
coalitions, in order to examine and predict how dynamic coali-
tions might function in a Domain Based Security environment.
Responsibility: Section II explores the question: where
does responsibility lie for coalition membership? We want to
broaden this question to include all coalition actions. Some
way of “keeping records” of coalition behaviour may be
valuable, so that these questions can be asked retrospectively,
and that a basis can be provided for recovery from undesirable
states.
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